Is GitHub Copilot Down?

Oct 12 , 20:16 UTC Resolved - On October 12th 2026 11:51 UTC GitHub experienced elevated 500 responses across several application pages. This caused failures on Issues and Pull Requests as well as Projects and Actions. Customers also experienced delayed notifications in their web inbox and via email. The immediate impact to Issues, Pull Requests, Projects, and Actions was mitigated by 12:41 UTC on October 12th. Notifications deliveries to the web inbox and via email were recovering at 15:27 UTC and fully mitigated by 20:16 UTC. The incident was triggered through a latent condition in our notifications delivery pipeline that put a high volume of an expensive query on our sharded database replicas. This reduced available database capacity to serve requests for Issues, Pull Requests, Projects, and Actions. We have fixed the notifications pipeline’s code path that issued the expensive query. We are also improving resilience of the database layer to reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents. Oct 12 , 19:28 UTC Update - Web and email notifications will be delayed for 1 more hour as we are close to completing the backlog of notifications. Oct 12 , 17:34 UTC Update - Web and email notifications continue to be delayed as we work through a backlog of notifications. Oct 12 , 15:50 UTC Update - Notifications have resumed but will continue to be delayed as we work through a backlog. Oct 12 , 15:19 UTC Update - We have successfully applied a mitigation for notifications, and notifications have resumed but will continue to be delayed as we work through a backlog. Oct 12 , 14:37 UTC Update - We have mitigated the issues with Actions, issues, and projects, and have a mitigation in progress to address the delay with notifications. Oct 12 , 14:36 UTC Update - The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability. Oct 12 , 14:35 UTC Update - The degradation affecting Issues has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability. Oct

Oct 7 , 18:04 UTC Resolved - On October 7, 2026, from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC, GitHub experienced a recurrence of the write-operation outage from earlier that day. Both outages shared the same root cause. Please refer to the combined summary covering both incidents, their impact, and our prevention measures: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7 Oct 7 , 18:00 UTC Update - All systems have recovered. We have applied mitigations and do not anticipate another recurrence. Oct 7 , 17:27 UTC Monitoring - The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability. Oct 7 , 17:25 UTC Update - We observed widespread impact across GitHub services from 16:52 UTC to 17:01 UTC, and are investigating the root cause. All systems have recovered. This incident is a reoccurrence of the incident from earlier in the day https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7. Durable mitigation is in progress. We will provide another update in 30 minutes. Oct 7 , 17:17 UTC Investigating - We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions, Git Operations, Issues and Pull Requests

Oct 7 , 16:25 UTC Resolved - On October 7, 2026, GitHub had two outages of write operations with the same cause, totaling about 19 minutes. The first ran from 15:06 to 15:16 UTC (about 10 minutes) and the second from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC (about 9 minutes). In both windows, actions that save or change data failed across Git operations, pull requests, issues, GitHub Actions, the API, webhooks, sign-in and authentication, GitHub Apps and OAuth, code scanning, Codespaces, and Copilot. Reading data was largely unaffected. In the first outage, 5.6% of all web and API requests failed, peaking at 8.9%, and more than 12,000 organizations saw failed requests. Up to 26% of Git authentication requests failed, and 17% of Actions workflow runs failed with infrastructure errors. In the second outage, 6.2% of web and API requests failed, peaking at 9.3%, and more than 11,000 organizations were affected. Up to 25% of Git authentication requests failed, and 19% of Actions workflow runs failed. No databases experienced data loss, and operations retried after recovery succeeded. GitHub relies on an internal service that keeps track of which database servers should receive new and updated data. While replacing machines that run this service as part of regular maintenance, one of the new machines started with an outdated copy of its records, which still listed database servers we had already retired. When this node came online, it incorrectly modified routing configuration with the outdated records, routing write requests to non-existent database servers. Each outage ended when one of our established machines with correct configuration became the leader of the quorum and sent the correct configuration. After the first outage, we identified the new machine as the source and paused automated maintenance to stop it from being leader again. At 16:52 UTC, an automated maintenance task that did not honor the pause put it back in charge, and the outage happened again. We shut that machine down at

Oct 5 , 22:49 UTC Resolved - On October 5, 2026, between 18:48 and 22:49 UTC, GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners experienced degraded performance. Over the full incident, 14.3% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners and 26.5% of individual GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes. During the roughly 90-minute period of highest impact, 47.0% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners failed and 71.9% of GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes, while existing Pages sites continued to serve normally. A portion of customers also encountered intermittent errors in repository lists, licensing and billing pages, and some Copilot features. Self-hosted runners were not affected. The incident was caused by a partial networking failure that disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database and storage services. We mitigated the incident by shifting database and storage traffic to healthy regions and endpoints and increasing capacity for affected compute services. GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners recovered by 21:54 UTC, and all affected services recovered by 22:49 UTC. We are partnering with our cloud provider to understand the network failure and identify improvements to network-path resilience, detection, and recovery for similar incidents. Oct 5 , 22:40 UTC Update - Pages is operating normally. Oct 5 , 21:54 UTC Update - Actions is operating normally. Oct 5 , 21:32 UTC Update - We have applied mitigations to address GitHub Actions failures. Queued jobs are clearing, new jobs are not delayed, and we expect full runner recovery shortly. We continue to monitor for full recovery and are working to mitigate ongoing issues affecting other services, including access to repository lists, licensing, and billing pages. Oct 5 , 21:31 UTC Update - Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate. Oct 5 , 21:22 UTC Update - Pages is experiencing degraded pe

Oct 1 , 17:56 UTC Resolved - On October 1, 2026, GitHub Actions experienced two periods of delayed and failed job starts on GitHub-hosted runners, beginning at approximately 14:15 UTC. Across the 14:15–17:56 UTC incident-response window, approximately 0.68% of workflow runs experienced start delays, and 0.196% of jobs failed to start. A routing change at our cloud provider concentrated API traffic on a single backend, causing an increase in rate-limit errors. Incorrect retry behavior in the provider’s inventory service added load to the affected APIs, compounding the rate limiting. This disrupted runner provisioning and reduced available capacity in affected regions. The resulting increase in demand in unaffected regions exposed a concurrency limit in our job-assignment system, delaying jobs even where runners were available. During the response, we increased job-assignment concurrency, scaled runner capacity, and worked with our cloud provider to reduce API load by excluding our runner subscriptions from its inventory service. By approximately 16:15 UTC, jobs were starting and executing as expected. We continued mitigation and monitoring until the incident was resolved at 17:56 UTC. Our cloud provider has since increased resource-management API rate limits for our workloads. To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents, we are also adding more granular rate-limiting alerts and updating our job-assignment system to handle increased demand across fewer available regions. Oct 1 , 17:50 UTC Update - GitHub Actions experienced degraded performance for some hosted runners due to throttling within an upstream Azure dependency. Service capacity has recovered, and we are continuing to monitor while working with Azure on the underlying condition. Oct 1 , 16:48 UTC Update - We are currently applying a mitigation and anticipate recovery within thirty minutes. Oct 1 , 16:10 UTC Update - We have identified an issue with our upstream provider which is causing Actions